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I. Introduction
The year 2004 started on a hopeful note for US immigration advocates, with President
George W Bush announcing that his administration supported comprehensive immigration
reform, including a guest worker program and a component to address the large numbers
of undocumented migrants in the United States. All major presidential candidates agreed
that legalizing many of the undocumented workers in the United States was necessary. As
the year progressed, however, the national focus on the presidential election and splits
within the Republican Party derailed any significant immigration legislation.
A few important business immigration bills were enacted-most prominently, a bill af-
fecting intracompany transferees and temporary professional workers-but the anticipated
comprehensive immigration reform did not materialize by the end of 2004. The release of
the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission)' caused a flurry of proposals to tighten the United States' borders, which
ultimately resulted in the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004.2
During 2004, several prominent business groups argued that tighter border controls and
visa delays that resulted from security concerns had cost U.S. firms and the U.S. economy
tens of billions of dollars.3 Business leaders expressed concern that the security net had
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1. See generally, NATIONAL CoMMIssION ON TERRORIST ArTAcKs UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9-11 COMMISSION
REPORT (2004), available at http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/report/index.htm [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004)
[hereinafter Intelligence Reform Act].
3. See, e.g., Santangelo Group, Survey Results & Analysis: Do Visa Delays Hurt U.S. Business? (Jun. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.santangelogroup.com. Researchers surveyed 734 members of eight leadinginternational
trade associations to compile the report. According to the report, U.S. companies suffered a $30.7 billion
($25.35 billion in revenue losses, and $5.15 billion in indirect costs) financial impact between July 2002 and
March 2004 as a result of delays and denials in the processing of business visas. Companies surveyed reported
that the most severe processing issues were length and unpredictability of processing times, excessively long
waiting times to receive an interview, and apparently arbitrary visa denials.
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been cast too wide at the expense of international commerce, resulting in increasing pres-
sure for firms to outsource work or set up offices abroad.4 Furthermore, some of the nation's
leading scientific and academic organizations warned that the restrictions threatened their
ability to attract the brightest foreign students, and would eventually cause the United States
to lose its lead in the forefront of science and technology.' In light of these complaints,
administration officials claimed to be making efforts to address these concerns. 6
II. Legislative Developments
The pending presidential election overshadowed most legislative developments during
2004. OnJanuary 7, 2004, President Bush announced a major immigration reform proposal
that would allow immigrants with job offers to enter the United States temporarily,7 as well
as legalize many immigrants who are already here. Details of the plan remained unclear,
but the President said he was committed to a system that would allow American employers
to bring in foreign workers when Americans were unwilling or unable to fill the jobs.' The
President's program would also legalize eight to ten million illegal immigrants by granting
them temporary three-year visas. 9 Opponents of Bush's proposal called the plan an amnesty
program that would pardon and reward aliens who have broken immigration laws and
encourage future illegal immigration. While numerous immigration bills were introduced
into Congress during the year, few immigration bills passed, even when there was bipartisan
support. Anti-immigration advocates effectively controlled the House Immigration Sub-
committee, and the President's failure to exercise any leverage to move immigration leg-
islation left most bills stalled.
A. 9/11 COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS
Throughout 2004, the 9/11 Commission held hearings to investigate the events leading
up to the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.
Many of the hearings focused on immigration issues. On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commis-
sion issued a comprehensive report, 0 in which the commissioners concluded that immi-
gration policies touted as being essential for national security had been ineffective, and had
produced little information that could lead to the identification or apprehension of terror-
ists. The commissioners also criticized controversial post 9/11 programs that had mostly
targeted individuals from Muslim and Arab countries."
Prior to the Commission's hearings, U.S. officials contended that immigration personnel




7. Press release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 1/20040107-3.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Final Report, supra note 1.
11. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9-11 COMMIssIoN REPORT EXECU-
TIVE SUMMARY (2004) available at http://www.9-1 commission.gov/report/91 lReportExec.pdf [hereinafter
Executive Summary).
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reside in the United States.12 In the seventh hearing held by the 9/11 Commission, however,
the commissioners found that the government repeatedly missed opportunities to prevent
thirteen of the 9/11 hijackers from entering the United States. 3 The Commission's report
found that consular officers and immigration officials missed clues in visa applications, entry
documents, and passports that should have caused them to deny entry to the hijackers. 14 In
addition, the Commission heard testimony indicating that most immigration officials were
focused on identifying individuals who might try to settle in the United States, rather than
on identifying terrorists. 5
The Commission's report confirmed that at least five suspected al Qaeda members were
prevented from joining the 9/11 plot.6 Four were denied visas, and a fifth, Mohamed al
Qahtani, was sent back to Saudi Arabia. 7 Al Qahtani made his way to Afghanistan, where
he was later captured and sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.18 Officials believe that Al Qahtani
was the "twentieth" hijacker-a theory that explains why one of the planes had four hijackers,
while the others had five. 19 Officials theorize that because Flight 93 had only four hijackers,
the passengers were able to fight their attackers and crash the plane in Pennsylvania. 0
B. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM
Following the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, Congress commenced efforts to
enact the recommendations of the Commission. While there was bipartisan support for
most of the recommendations, an impasse over immigration reform almost derailed enact-
ment of a final bill.' Several conservative lawmakers sought to go beyond the recommen-
dations of the Commission and enact harsh anti-immigrant measures, but these efforts
mostly failed.22 The final bill, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Intelligence Reform Act),23 signed into law on December 17, 2004, contained nu-
merous immigration-related provisions aimed at improving security.2 4 For example, the law
required (1) testing of advanced technology such as sensors, video, and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) on the northern border; (2) surveillance of the southern border with UAVs
and increased Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents; and
(3) increased detention beds.25 In addition, the Intelligence Reform Act required the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish minimum identification standards for
boarding commercial aircraft, while also establishing a visa and passport security program
12. Id.
13. Id.




18. Executive Summary, supra note 11.
19. Id.
20. Final Report, supra note 1.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Intelligence Reform Act, supra note 2.
24. For a comprehensive discussion of all the provisions of the Intelligence Reform Bill, see David Leopold,
Debate Over the 9/11 Intelligence Reform Bills: A Preview of Things To Come?, in BUSINESS IMMIGRATION: CHARTING
A COURSE THROUGH NEW WATERS 1-8 (Nancy-Jo Merrit ed., 2005).
25. Id.
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in the State Department and authorizing funding for an immigration security initiative that
allowed immigration screening overseas.2 6 Furthermore, the bill also required the creation
of a Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.27 Aliens who received military-type training
from designated terrorist organizations were deportable, and the law mandated a GAO
study of potential weaknesses in the U.S. asylum system." Finally, the most notable pro-
vision of the law established minimum federal standards for birth certificates and driver's
licenses.2 9
C. H AND L LEGISLATION
While the Terrorist Prevention Act made most of the headlines, another piece of legis-
lation passed later in 2004 had more immediate impact on the business immigration com-
munity. The L- 1 Visa and H- lB Visa Reform Act ("Visa Reform Act"),30 signed into law
on December 8, 2004, changed several key rules for L-1 (intracompany transferee) and H-
1B (temporary professional) workers." For L-I visas, the Visa Reform Act prohibited the
controversial practice of subcontracting employees to third party businesses, and all L-1
blanket applicants are obligated to meet the one year requirement applicable to all other
L-1 applicants32 With regard to H-LB workers, the Visa Reform Act reinstated and made
permanent the H-1B non-displacement attestation requirements that were in effect until
October 1, 2003 . 3 In addition, the law also reinstated the previous worker retraining fee,
increasing the amount from $1000 to $1500, however, employers with less than twenty-
five full-time equivalent employees in the United States need only pay $750.14 Previously
exempt employers continue to be exempt from the fee. The law allowing employers to pay
95 percent of the prevailing wage was changed so that employers must now pay 100 percent
of the prevailing wage or higher.33 The new law made permanent provisions that allow the
U.S. Department of Labor to investigate any employer that it reasonably believes is engaged
in fraud and abuse.36 The most notable change on the H-lB front, however, is an exemption
of up to 20,000 graduates of U.S. graduate degree programs each year from the infamous
H-1B cap.37
The Visa Reform Act directed DHS to charge a $500 fraud prevention and detection
fee-on top of the normal processing fee, the worker retraining fund fee, and the premium
processing fee when faster processing is chosen-in all new H-lB and L-1 cases, as well as





30. L-1 Visa and H-1B Visa Reform Act., Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004) [hereinafter Visa
Reform Act].
31.Id.
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and L-1 Fraud Prevention and Detection Account, which will be shared by the State De-
partment, DHS, and the Department of Labor.
3 9
D. IMPORTANT BILLS NOT ENACTED
Throughout 2004, many bills were introduced in an effort to enact comprehensive im-
migration reform and address other important immigration-related issues. Notable bills
that were introduced but failed to pass included the AgJobs bill, the DREAM Act, the
CLEAR Act, the Civil Liberties Restoration Act, and the Permanent Partners Act.
The Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits and Security Act" (AgJobs) was intended to
provide a process for certain illegal agricultural workers to obtain permanent status in the
United States. With strong bipartisan support, the bill appeared headed for passage when
it was blocked from consideration by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN).4' The Wall
Street Journal reported that the White House wanted to prevent the bill from reaching the
President's desk because of election year concerns.
42
Despite bipartisan support, the DREAM Act 3 also failed to pass for the second year in
a row. This law promised to legalize many undocumented students who had grown up in
the United States.- In addition, lawmakers also resurrected another failed proposal from
the prior year, the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR Act),
45
which required state and local law enforcement officials to enforce federal immigration
laws. Essentially, cities and states would lose federal funding if their police refused to help
the Department of Homeland Security track down illegal immigrants for deportation. More
than a hundred lawmakers co-sponsored the bill, but many state and local law enforcement
officials said that the law would hinder policing efforts.-
A group of Democratic Senators and Congressional Representatives introduced the Civil
Liberties Restoration Act of 2004 (CLRA)41 to rectify the way in which immigrants have
been treated in the United States since 9/11. Many immigrants detained in the post-9/ 1I
sweep were denied access to attorneys and family members, held for months without being
charged, or subjected to secret hearings. 48 Some detainees were physically and mentally
abused. The CLRA would prohibit blanket closures of immigration hearings, but authorize
partial or full closure of individual cases when necessary to protect national security.49 Fur-
thermore, the CLRA required that detained individuals be served with notice of the charges
39. Id.
40. Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits and Security Act of 2003, S. 1645, 108th Cong. (2003).
41. Id.
42. David Rogers, Farm-Worker Bill Becomes a Hot Potato, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at A4.
43. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003).
44. Id.
45. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).
46. National Lawyers Guild, National Immigration Project: Legislation to Deputize Local Police as Immigration
Agents Gaining Ground in Congress, available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/Getlnvolved/CLEAR
%20Act%200ppose.htn (last visited May 27, 2005).
47. Civil Liberties Restoration Act, S. 2528, H.R. 4591, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter CLRAJ.
48. The American Immigration Law Foundation, Targets of Suspicion: The Impact of Post-9/1 1 Policies on
Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United States (May 2004), available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/ipf
050104.asp [hereinafter Targets of Suspicion].
49. CLRA, supra note 47.
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against them and be brought before an immigration judge in a timely fashion."0 While
proponents of the bill thought it had little chance of passage, they introduced it to draw
the public's attention to the harsh treatment of immigrants after 9/11. 51
Next, the Permanent Partners Immigration Act," which would grant same-sex couples
the same immigration benefits as married couples, was also introduced in Congress but
failed to pass. Although controversial, the bill had more than a hundred co-sponsors."
Under the previously-passed Defense of Marriage Act,54 marriage is defined under federal
law-including immigration law-as the union of a man and a woman. Because of this
definition, gay couples who marry are unable to sponsor their partners for permanent res-
idence. Immigration attorneys have thus been forced to devise creative solutions to keep
these couples from becoming illegal, and this bill sought to rectify this problem.
IL. Administrative and Regulatory Developments
A. U.S. VISIT
The biggest story of the year in the immigration regulatory arena was the January 5,
2004 debut of U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S. VISIT), an
automated entry-exit security system that tracks the arrival and departure of aliens, verifies
their identities, and authenticates their travel documents using biometric identifiers such
as fingerprints and photographs." Theoretically, the program is intended to reduce the
number of persons who overstay their visa limits by requiring anyone subject to U.S. VISIT
to register electronically upon arriving and departing the United States.16 During 2004, the
full program was not in place. DHS implemented only the entry portion of the program,
which was introduced at more than a hundred airports and cruise ship terminals." Initially,
the program only applied to visitors who entered the United States with visas, but DHS
officials indicated that the program would be expanded in the future."s The departure com-
ponent of U.S. VISIT was supposed to go into effect at the end of 2004, but this did not
happen as planned.
B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
1. Backlog Reduction
A significant problem at DHS has been the perennial issue of backlogs in the processing
of applications and petitions. President Bush highlighted this problem in his 2000 election
campaign and also stated that "legal immigrants should be greeted with open arms, rather
than endless lines.""9 DHS's predecessor agency devised a Backlog Elimination Plan, the
50. Id.
51. Targets of Suspicion, supra note 48.
52. Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2003, S. 1510, H.R. 832, 108th Cong. (2003).
53. Id.
54. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
55. Department of Homeland Security, Travel & Transportation: U.S.-VISIT, availableathttp://www.dhs.gov/




59. Press release, White House, A Blueprint for New Beginnings, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/usbudget/blueprint/budl4.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
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goal of which was to reach a national average cycle time of six months or less for all appli-
cations by the end of 2003.60 This goal was not met. According to the agency, the failure
to meet its planned goal was a result of new post 9/11 security mandates. OnJune 16, 2004,
the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Eduardo Aguirre,
submitted to Congress a revised version of this plan 6' to meet the requirements of section
459(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,62 which called for the agency to advise Con-
gress how it planned to reduce the backlog of non-immigrant, immigrant, naturalization,
and asylum/refugee applications and petitions. The new plan called for reaching the six-
month processing target by the end of 2006.63 In its Third Quarter Update for Fiscal Year
2004, USCIS reported significant progress in meeting this goal by having reduced the
backlog by 12 9/10 percent since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2004.
61
2. Biometric Passport Deadline
At the beginning of 2004, many expressed concern about a Congressionally-mandated
6
'
October 26, 2004 deadline for all Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries to have biometric
features such as digital photographs or fingerprints in all new passports. According to the
mandate, failure to comply with the deadline would mean loss of VWP privileges. 66 Great
Britain and Japan, among other countries, notified DHS that they would miss the deadline.
67
Citizens of countries that failed to meet the deadline would be required to apply for visas
in their home countries. Moreover, experts predicted that consulates would be unable to
accommodate the additional visa applicants, and others would be deterred from visiting
altogether, resulting in a loss of billions of dollars to the U.S. economy. Early in 2004, the
Bush administration requested that Congress extend the deadline until October 2006, and
on August 9, 2004, President Bush signed H.R. 4417, which extended the deadline by one
year to October 26, 2005.68 DHS also announced that it would soon begin enrolling VWP
travelers through the U.S. VISIT program at all airports and seaports.
69
3. Visa Quota Problems
As a result of legislation, on October 1, 2003, the quota for the popular H-lB temporary
professional worker visas had dropped from 195,000 to 65,000.70 With this substantial re-
duction in available visas, the H-1B quota for Fiscal Year 2004 was reached on February 17,
60. Id.
61. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Backlog Elimination Plan (Nov. 5, 2004), available at http://
uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/BEPQ3v2-1.pdf.
62. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543
(2002).
66. Id.
67. Press Release, U.S. State Department, State Dept. Says Visa Waiver Countries Will Miss Passport
Deadline (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Mar/08-3567 9 3.html.
68. Modification of Certain Deadlines for Machine-Readable Tamper Resistant Entry and Exit Documents,
Pub. L. No. 108-299, § 1, 118 Stat. 1100 (2004).
69. Id.
70. Cyrus D. Mehtha, The H-1B Visa Program, available at http://www.cyrusmetha.com/Gen-Imm-cyrus.
asp?news-id = 282&intPage = I (updated Mar. 14, 2005).
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2004, less than halfway through the fiscal year.7' Following an announcement that the cap
had been reached, DHS advised that it would reject any new applications for H-1B em-
ployment filed after the cap was reached and would not accept future applications until
April 1, 2004. Petitions filed on or after April 1, 2004 had to request a start date of Octo-
ber 1, 2004 or later." Many immigration lawyers immediately scrambled to find alternatives
to the H-1B visas, but the end of the saga was not yet in sight. Further complications arose
on October 1, 2004, when, for the first time in history, the cap was reached on the first day
of the fiscal year (October 1, 2004).71 No additional visas would be available until October 1,
2005. This is the first time that H-1B visas have been unavailable for almost an entire fiscal
year.
7 4
On March 10, 2004, less than a month after the H-1B quota was reached, DHS an-
nounced that it had also reached the congressionally-mandated cap of 66,000 H-2B tem-
porary non-agricultural workers for Fiscal Year 2004.71 H-2B workers fill many summer
seasonal jobs, and the announcement that the cap had been reached threatened to derail
several industries, including the Alaska seafood industry, which employs hundreds of H-2B
workers in its summer processing season.76 Employers pressed for an immediate increase,
claiming their businesses were in jeopardy, but only a few selected employers were able to
obtain such relief.77 Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle introduced relief legislation, but
no such legislation actually passed, other than a bill providing special relief for Alaska." s
C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
In January 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a follow-up re-
port79 about the visa revocation process of the Departments of State and Homeland Security.
The GAO's original report in 20030 found that the visa revocation process should be
strengthened to be effective as an antiterrorism tool. The goal of the follow-up investigation
was to determine if the weaknesses reported in the original study had been addressed. The
follow-up report, however, found that the visa revocation process still had serious problems,
including a lack of procedure and performance standards, outstanding policy and legal
issues, and a lack of coordination between DHS and the State Department. GAO recom-
71. Information Regarding the H-lB Numerical Limitation for Fiscal Year 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 8675-76
(Feb. 25, 2004).
72. Id.
73. America Visa Law, H-1B Cap Has Been Reached for Fiscal Year 2005 (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://
www.americavisalaw.com/Default.aspx?tabid = 3 1.
74. Id.
75. American Immigration Lawyers Association, H-2B Emergency Relief "Save Our Small and Seasonal Busi-
nesses Act of 2005" (2005), available at http://www.aila.org/fileViewer.aspx?docID = 17884.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-287, 118 Stat. 951 (2004) (con-
taining a limited H-2B exception for certain seafood industry workers).
79. Press Release, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to
Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d04795.pdf.
80. Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies
and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process (June 2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03798.pdf.
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mended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly develop a government
policy and address outstanding legal and policy issues in the visa revocation process area.
On July 16, 2004, the State Department ended its policy of allowing domestic revalida-
tion of certain non-immigrant visas. The domestic revalidation of non-immigrant visas was
originally developed to help foreign government officials and international organization
employees. Over time, the privilege was extended to some business-related visas. In ending
the practice, the State Department cited the increased interview requirements and the need
for biometric identifiers in visas imposed by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act.8' To lessen the inconvenience to affected applicants, the State Department
directed visa adjudicating posts to give priority to those who would have benefited from
the prior visa reissuance policy. 2 The State Department also renewed the designations of
several organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, meaning that under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA), persons in the United States, or subject to U.S. juris-
diction, are forbidden from providing material support to them.83 Forty organizations had
been so designated by the year's end.
84
D. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OnJuly 21, 2004, the Department of Labor (DOL) published an interim rule s' to address
the backlog of pending applications for permanent labor certification of foreign workers.
The rule proposed allowing the National Certifying Officer to transfer applications await-
ing processing by State Workforce Agencies (SWAs) or by the Employment and Training
Administration ("ETA") Regional Offices to a centralized ETA processing center.8 6 The
DOL proposed this rule in conjunction with its plans to establish a new Program Electronic
Review Management (PERM) program for filing labor certifications.87 PERM is intended
to reduce processing times for the vast majority of labor certification cases.88 On Decem-
ber 27, 2004, DOL published its long-awaited PERM regulations, making them effective
on March 28, 2005.89 The regulations set up a new system for processing employers' ap-
plications for permanent employment of aliens, requiring employers to conduct recruitment
before filing their applications. 9 The SWAs will provide prevailing wage determinations
to employers, but will no longer receive or process applications as they do under the current
system.91 Employers will be required to place a job order with the SWA, which the SWA




84. See U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/
s/ct/rls/fs37 191.htm.
85. Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Backlog Reduction,




89. Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Implementation of
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will process like any other job order.92 Employers will have the option of filing applications
either electronically, using web-based forms and instructions, or through the mail.9 The
new program is supposed to eliminate the long-standing backlog in labor certification ap-
plications, as well as meeting criticisms that the current system is too burdensome and time-
consuming.
IV. New Case Law Developments
During 2004, the federal courts continued to see increases in their immigration-related
caseloads. One U.S. newspaper ran an investigative article stating that federal circuit courts
have seen a 600 percent increase in deportation and asylum appeals.94 This increase was
blamed on changes in the way the U.S. Department ofJustice handles administrative appeals
of immigration cases. 9 Two years ago, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) began
"streamlining" most proceedings, and its membership was reduced from twenty-three
judges to eleven. 96 Although this restructuring has nearly eliminated a huge backlog of
administrative appeals, it has also had the side-effect of creating overload in the federal
appellate courts, which handle most federal court challenges to immigration decisions. 9
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
1. Rumsfeld v. Padilla
OnJune 2 8, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its long-awaited decision in Rums-
find v. Padilla.9" In a decision with implications for immigration attorneys who file habeas
corpus petitions, the Court addressed the question of the proper respondent in a habeas
corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by a United States citizen held by the
U.S. government as an "enemy combatant."99 In a footnote to the decision, °° the Court
stated that it was expressly refraining from deciding whether the Attorney General or any
other immigration official is the proper respondent when a non-U.S. citizen files an
immigration-related habeas petition. Experts predict, however, that the government will try
to argue that Padilla is controlling in circuits where this particular issue has not yet been
decided. 101
Authorities suspected Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen who was arrested at Chicago's O'Hare
airport when he arrived on an international flight, of having links to the Al Qaeda terrorist
group.0 2 Padilla was detained and initially held on a material witness warrant in New York,
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Claire Cooper & Emily Bazar, Immigration Appeals Swamp Federal Courts, SACRAMENTo BEE, Sept. 5,




98. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
99. Id. at 2712.
100. Id. at 2718.
101. See Trina Realmuto & Nancy Morawetz, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Rurnsfeldv. Padilla
on Immigration Habeas Petitions (June 30, 2004), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/lacpa_063004.asp.
102. Id.
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and counsel was appointed to represent him. 103 While material witness proceedings were
pending before the Southern District of New York, and without notice to counsel, the
President designated Padilla an enemy combatant and transferred him to the custody of
the Department of Defense, which moved Padilla to a naval brig in South Carolina. °- Two
days after the transfer to South Carolina, Padilla's attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in
the Southern District of New York challenging Padilla's detention and naming the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of Defense, and the officer in charge of the naval brig as respondents. 05
The government argued that the officer in charge of the naval brig was the only proper
respondent and that the Southern District of New York was an improper venue because it
could not issue a habeas corpus writ to a respondent located outside its territorial jurisdic-
tion.16 Padilla's attorney countered that the case should remain in New York because the
Secretary of Defense had purposefully reached into New York to seize Padilla and move
him to another state. 07 In a 2003 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that Padilla could name the Secretary of Defense as a respondent in his petition, and
the case could remain in New York. 108 In a 5-4 decision, however, the Supreme Court held
that the only proper respondent in a traditional habeas corpus petition involving a "core
challenge" to physical confinement is the actual or immediate custodian of the facility where
the person is detained. 109 Thus, in Padilla's case, the commander of the naval brig was the
proper respondent, and the Southern District of New York did not have jurisdiction to
issue a habeas writ when the detention facility was in South Carolina." 0 The concurring
opinion stated that the decision was based on venue or personal jurisdiction rules."'I Because
Padilla filed his habeas petition in the wrong court, the Supreme Court ordered that the
case be remanded so that the petition could be dismissed without prejudice." 2
The case was watched by immigration attorneys because it is common for U.S. immi-
gration authorities to transfer aliens out of jurisdictions in which they have counsel and
habeas petitions pending. Similarly, immigration attorneys often name the Attorney General
or the Secretary of Homeland Security as the respondent." 3 The Supreme Court left open
the question whether the Attorney General is the proper respondent in a habeas corpus
petition filed by a noncitizen pending deportation." 4 Prior to Padilla, the Circuit Courts
were split on the issue."' For immigration lawyers, the final Padilla decision left more
questions unanswered than resolved. The opinion emphasized that the court's ruling ap-
plied to core challenges where physical custody is at issue, but not to other types of habeas
cases, such as those where physical custody is not at issue, those in which the petition has




106. Realmuto, supra note 101.
107. Id.
108. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 E3d 695, 704-10 (2d. Cir. 2003).
109. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2718.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2727 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. Id.
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is "present" in the district through his agents' conduct.ll6 Arguably, most immigration habeas
cases are not core challenges because they primarily challenge a final agency decision, rather
than the physical custody itself."7 Although the Supreme Court also stated in a footnote
that the ruling did not apply to immigration cases," 8 practitioners expect that government
lawyers will argue that Padilla's holding should apply in the lower courts where the immi-
gration issue has not yet been resolved.
2. Leocal v. Ashcroft
On November 9, 2004, the Supreme Court decided Leocal v. Ashcroft," 9 a case in which
the court was called upon to decide whether certain drunk driving convictions are "aggra-
vated felonies" under U.S. immigration law. If a particular criminal offense is an aggravated
felony, an alien is subject to very harsh sanctions, including mandatory detention and almost
certain deportation.
Josue Leocal, a lawful permanent resident from Haiti, was charged under a Florida statute
with driving under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury. 20 He pled
guilty and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison.', "In November 2000, while he
was serving his sentence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated re-
moval proceedings against him pursuant to INA § 237(a)." 122 Because the INS claimed that
Leocal's DUI conviction was a "'crime of violence"' and, therefore, an aggravated felony
under the INA, Leocal was ordered deported to Haiti. 12 3 "The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit agreed."124 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that the negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense was not grounds for categorizing an
offense as an aggravated felony."'5 The Court said that the statute suggests a crime of
violence must require intent greater than negligence.26 "Drunk driving is a nationwide
problem, as evidenced by the efforts of legislatures to prohibit such conduct and impose
appropriate penalties. But this fact does not warrant our shoehorning it into statutory sec-
tions where it does not fit."27 The Leocal decision effectively granted relief to hundreds of
aliens who had been labeled aggravated felons and subjected to mandatory detention and
deportation for certain drunk driving offenses.
3. Rasul v. Bush
By a 6-3 margin, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Rasul v. Bush, 128 ruled against
the Bush Administration's policy of detaining foreign nationals as "enemy combatants" at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. Fourteen detainees had filed petitions declaring that
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2718 n.8 ("Because the issue is not before us today, we again decline to
resolve it.").
119. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004).




124. Leocal, 125 S. Ct. at 379.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 382-83.
127. Id. at 384.
128. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2687-88 (2004).
VOL. 39, NO. 2
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAW 441
they were not involved in terrorist acts, had not been charged with any crimes, and had
been denied access to counsel and the courts. 9 The Bush administration asserted that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to the usual rights of prisoners of war set out in the Geneva
Conventions.Y0 Government officials also claimed that enemy combatants are not allowed
the constitutional protections given to ordinary criminal suspects.' 3' The Administration
stated that only the President has the authority to order detention of enemy combatants,
and, therefore, the courts have no business reviewing President Bush's decision in this
matter.
The main question before the Supreme Court was whether the habeas corpus right to
judicial review of detention applies in an area over which the United States has complete
and "exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty.""" Guantanamo Bay is leased
from Cuba, and, thus, is outside the territory of the United States. The Supreme Court
held that the base is not beyond the reach of American courts although it is outside the
country.'33 The court also stated that there is no distinction between U.S. citizens and non-
U.S. citizens in the right to § 2241 habeas corpus review.3 4
B. U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT DEcISIONS
1. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft
In a case with broad implications for immigrants who admit any sort of connection to
terrorist or insurgent groups in their home countries, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft'33 that an alien was ineligible for relief under U.S. immi-
gration laws when he had provided food and shelter to freedom fighters in his village who
were engaged in military activity against the Indian government. Singh-Kaur entered the
United States without inspection, and applied for asylum after deportation proceedings
were initiated against him. 36 He claimed that he was subjected to religious persecution in
India due to his involvement in two groups that promoted the Sikh faith, and, in his supporting
affidavit, Singh-Kaur admitted that he provided food and shelter to the freedom fighters. The
BIA held that his conduct in providing food and shelter to the fighters constituted affording
material support to terrorists within the meaning of INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C.
§1 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).' 37
The Third Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the BI s interpretation of
the INA, making Singh-Kaur ineligible for admission because he provided material support
to individuals who he knew or should of known were engaged in terrorist activities. 3 A
vigorous dissenting opinion argued the majority had read the word "material" out of the
statutory language, and that providing food and tents for religious meetings, without more
129. Id. at 2687.
130. Id. at 2691.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2693.
133. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91.
134. Id. at 2688-89.
135. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 E3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 294.
137. Id. at 296.
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involvement or support, was not an act "of the degree and kind contemplated by the 'ma-
terial support' provision-material acts in support of terrorism."' 3 9
2. Resendiz-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft
In Resendiz-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft,14° the Eleventh Circuit decided that state expungements
are insufficient to remove the immigration penalties of a conviction. Fidencio Resendiz-
Alcaraz, a Mexican citizen, sought review of a final removal order.' 4' Resendiz-Alcaraz pled
guilty to a Missouri charge of possession of less than thirty-five grams of marijuana, a class
A misdemeanor, and after a year of probation, the state court expunged his conviction. 42
In 2001, the INS initiated removal proceedings 41 Resendiz-Alcaraz sought cancellation of
removal, arguing that the state court expungement rendered him free of a conviction for
immigration purposes and, therefore, eligible for cancellation.144 The Immigration Judge
denied relief on the grounds that a state court expungement does not absolve an alien of
his drug conviction for immigration purposes. 4 The BIA affirmed. 46
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Resendiz-Alcaraz's argument that, because the Missouri
state court expungement resulted from a rehabilitative initiative like that of the Federal
First Offender Act ("FFOA"), he should receive the same treatment as if FFOA applied.'l 1
Under FFOA, expunged simple possession convictions are not treated as convictions under
federal law. 4s The Court explained that the BIA had treated state court expungements for
first-time drug offenders just like federal ones until Congress passed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (HIRAIRA) of 1996.49 Under the IIRAIRA, an
alien has a conviction for immigration purposes if a judge or jury finds him guilty, he pleads
guilty, or he pleads no contest to the offense, and a judge imposes punishment.1 ° Resendiz-
Alcaraz satisfied these conditions because he pled guilty and served a one-year probation. 5'
Thus, the IIRAIRA effectively nullifies a state court expungement for immigration pur-
poses. The Court rejected Resendiz-Alcaraz's argument that the IIRAIRA violates equal
protection because an alien prosecuted under federal law may avoid removal through the
FFO!s recognition of expungements, whereas an alien prosecuted under state law has no
such opportunity.l"Z The Court reasoned that Congress could rationally distinguish between
the FFOA and state expungements.
3. Class Action Lawsuit Settled
A class action amnesty case, Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Ridge, the longest pending class
action suit in immigration history, was approved by a federal district court judge on Janu-
139. Id. at 301 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
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ary 23, 2004.'53 In September 2003, the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law
and DHS reached a settlement'14 under a one-time 1986 amnesty program that had allowed
150,000 undocumented immigrants to apply for legal resident status in the United States.
5
Undocumented immigrants who had resided in the U.S. since 1982 were able to obtain
legal status under the 1986 law. 15 6 "The class action suit challenged an INS rule that dis-
qualified those who had briefly traveled abroad during the period of required residence for
the amnesty.' 5 7 In April 1988, a federal judge extended the application period by four
months for those who had been turned away because the travel rule was illegal.
5 INS
agreed to change the rule, but repeatedly appealed federal court orders upholding the
extension for the next fifteen years. 5 9
"Under the approved settlement, immigrants who believe they qualified for the 1986
amnesty but were turned away have a one-year period beginning in May 2004 to apply to
adjust their status."' 6 0 The Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law also reached
a settlement in a separate class action case, Newman v. Citizenship & Immigration Services,'
6
'
which involved another 100,000 immigrants who were turned away by INS during the
amnesty program because they, too, had briefly traveled abroad. The Newman plaintiffs
returned by improperly using non-immigrant visas. 62 This case awaits approval of a federal
district court judge.161
C. ADMINISTRATIVE COURT DECISIONS
The BIA decided six precedential cases in 2004. In the first case, In re Vargas, 64 the Board
determined that first degree manslaughter (in violation of section 125.20 of New York Penal
Law) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 18(b), and is therefore an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). In its next precedential case, In re
Malta, 6 the Board held that a stalking offense for harassing conduct in violation of section
646.9(b) of the California Penal Code, which proscribes stalking when there is a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the stalking
behavior, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and is therefore an aggravated
felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(F).
In In re K-A-,' 6 6 the Board held that once an asylee has been placed in removal
proceedings, the Immigration Judge and the BIA have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
153. Siskind's Imtnigration Bulletin, CSS Settlement Approved (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.visa
law.com/04feb l/14febI 04.html.
154. The terms of the settlement are available at www.centerforhumanrights.org (last visited May 27, 2005).
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the asylee's applications for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility. In In re
Cisneros-Gonzalez,167 the BIA held that an alien's period of continuous physical presence in
the United States is deemed to end when the alien is served with the charging document
that is the basis for the current proceeding. Thus, service of a charging document in a prior
proceeding does not serve to end the alien's period of continuous physical presence with
respect to an application for cancellation of removal filed in a later proceeding.
In In re L-K-, 16 an important case for asylum applicants, the Board decided that where
an alien filed an asylum application while in lawful nonimmigrant status, the nonimmigrant
status subsequently expired, and the asylum application was referred to the Immigration
Court. Thus, the alien is not eligible to adjust status under INA § 245(a) because the alien
has failed to continuously maintain a lawful status since entry into the United States. This
decision makes many asylum applicants ineligible to adjust status in removal proceedings.
On October 19, 2004, the BIA decided In re Eslamizar,169 holding that an alien found guilty
of a "violation" under Oregon law does not have a "conviction" for immigration purposes
under § 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(A).
Finally, on December 1, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a one-sentence de-
cision17° denying certification of the BIA's decision in In re C-Y-Z-, 7' a case involving
a Chinese asylum applicant who claimed persecution on account of his opposition to Chi-
nese birth control policies. The BIA granted the case, but INS opposed the grant because
the applicant's wife was sterilized, and the INS reasoned that Chinese authorities were
unlikely to sterilize the applicant as well." When the BIA rejected the JINS's argument,
INS had asked the Attorney General for review of the Board's decision.'
V. Asylum and Refugee Law; Temporary Protected Status
Refugee resettlement for Fiscal Year 2004 began to rebound from the serious delays
caused by post 9/11 background and security checks.11 4 Security concerns had contributed
to a sharp decline in the number in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, but the final number for
the 2004 Fiscal Year was 52,868, an 85 percent increase over the prior fiscal year's total of
28,422 refugee admissions.' In contrast to refugees, who have been able to adjust their
status and obtain permanent residence after one year, asylees continued to experience un-
conscionable delays in adjusting their status to permanent residence. Asylees, unlike refu-
gees, have been subject to a 10,000 annual cap that has resulted in predictions that it will
take more than a decade for most current asylees to adjust their status. 76
In Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, a class action lawsuit filed by the American Immigration Law
Foundation, a federal judge condemned the government for its treatment of adjusting asy-
167. In re Gonzalez, 23 I&N Dec. 668, 688 (BIA 2004).
168. In re L-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 677, 677 (BIA 2004).
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170. See In re C-Y-Z-, 23 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2004).
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172. Id. at 915.
173. In re C-Y-Z-, 23 I&N Dec. 693 (1999).
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lees, calling the government's behavior a "national embarrassment."'77 The plaintiffs in the
case had been granted asylum in the U.S., but were waiting to obtain their permanent
resident status.' They successfully argued that over the past ten years, the INS and then
the USCIS had unlawfully failed to adjust the status of 22,000 asylees due to mismanage-
ment. 79 The agency's ineptitude increased the waiting time for these asylees to become
U.S. citizens and extended the waiting list for all asylees by more than two years. 8 0 The
judge ordered the federal government to adjust the status of the 22,000 waiting asylees.' 8'
On November 29, 2004, the USCIS published a final rule to implement a bilateral Safe
Third Country Agreement between the United States and Canada that affected asylum
seekers at U.S.-Canada land border ports-of-entry and persons transiting through the
United States or Canada during removal by the other country. s2 The regulation took effect
December 24, 2004.1s3 Under the agreement, the United States will return to Canada cer-
tain asylum seekers who attempt to enter the United States from Canada at a U.S.-Canada
land border port-of-entry or who removed from Canada. in transit through the United
States.8 4 Similarly, it permits Canada to return to the United States certain asylum seekers
attempting to enter Canada from the United States at a U.S.-Canada land border port-of-
entry and certain aliens being removed from the United States through Canada. ls' The
agreement makes exceptions for unaccompanied minors and some asylum seekers with
family members in the United States. 6
During 2004, the citizens of several countries continued to benefit from Temporary Pro-
tected Status ("TPS") in the United States. TPS extensions were granted to the following
countries: Burundi,187 El Salvador,188 Honduras,8 9 Liberia, 190 Nicaragua, 191 Somalia, 192 and
177. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F Supp. 2d 1076, 1087 (D. Mim. 2004).
178. Id. at 1077.
179. Id. at 1083.
180. Id. at 1087.
181. Id. at 1088.
182. See Implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Canada Regarding Asylum Claims Made in Transit and at Land Border Ports-of-Entry, 69
Fed. Reg. 69,480 (Nov. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 8 C.ER. pts. 208, 212, 235).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 69,485.
185. Id. at 69,487.
186. Id. at 69,482.
187. See Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Bunmdi, 69 Fed. Reg. 60165
(Oct. 7, 2004).
188. See Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador; Automatic Extension
of Employment Authorization Documentation for El Salvador TPS Beneficiaries, 70 Fed. Reg. 1,451 (Jan. 7,
2005).
189. See Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Honduras; Automatic Extension
of Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduras TPS Beneficiaries, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,084 (Nov. 3,
2004).
190. See Termination and Re-Designation of Liberia for Temporary Protected Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,297
(Aug. 25, 2004).
191. See Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua; Automatic Extension
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Sudan. 19 DHS terminated TPS for the following countries: Montserrat, as of February 27,
2005;194 and Sierra Leone, whose citizens were required to leave the United States byMay 3,
2004, unless they had obtained another lawful status. The decision to terminate TPS for
citizens of Sierra Leone was controversial. 19 Citizens of the West African nation, which
was plagued by a ten-year civil war that ended in 2002, had first been granted TPS in 1997,
and the designation was subsequently extended five times during the Clinton and Bush
administrations until the civil war ended. 196 Critics of the May 3 return date claim that
Sierra Leone is still an unsafe country.
197
In asylum case developments, the never-ending saga of Rodi Alvarado-Pefia continued
to vex advocates who have championed for more generous treatment of gender-based asy-
lum claims. Rodi Alvarado-Pefia, a Guatemalan woman who claimed extreme physical abuse
by her husband and fled to the United States, was initially granted asylum by an immigration
judge in 1996.19 s To qualify for political asylum, the potential asylee must demonstrate that
she has been persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion.199 Alvarado was granted asylum on account of her gender, which falls under
the category of a social group. That decision was overturned by the BLA in 1999 in the
enormously controversial case of In re R-A-. 2 0 Subsequently, Attorney General Janet
Reno intervened to overturn the BIA's decision and ordered it to issue a new decision after
proposed regulations governing gender-based asylum claims were issued.21' After Ms. Reno
left office, her successor, Attorney General John Ashcroft, certified the BIA's decision in
February 2003, promising to make a speedy decision himself. °2 In February 2004, when it
appeared that Mr. Ashcroft might be ready to make a decision, DHS filed a lengthy brief
supporting Ms. Alvarado's claim."3 DHS requested that Attorney General Ashcroft remand
the case to the BIA with instructions to summarily grant asylum without opinion.20 Alter-
natively, DHS asked that the AG wait to render a decision until the final DHS regulations
were published because they would make Alvarado eligible for asylum. 05 Following the
filing of the brief, no decision was forthcoming. In an order dated January 19, 2005, Mr.
193. See Extension and Re-Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Sudan, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,168
(Oct. 7, 2004).
194. See Termination of the Designation of Montserrat Under the Temporary Protected Status Program;
Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,642 (July 6, 2004).
195. See Termination of the Designation of Sierra Leone Under the Temporary Protected Status Program;
Extension of the Designation of Employment Authorization Documentation, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,407 (Sept.' 3,
2003).
196. Id. at 52,408.
197. Id. at 52,409.
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Ashcroft sent the case back to the BIA for a new decision.10 6 Ms. Alvarado's case has now
been pending for ten years. 07
VI. Conclusion
The year 2004 ended on a low note without the anticipated comprehensive immigration
reform that advocates expected at the start. At the same time, the end of the year came
without enactment of the harsh legislation that some had been predicting. The U.S. Su-
preme Court's decisions marked a hopeful trend, as the Court seemed to be monitoring
the actions of the Executive Branch more closely than in previous years.
206. Press Release, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Landmark Decision Delayed Once Again (Jan.
21, 2005), available at http://w3.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documentslegal/dhs-brief-ra.pdf.
207. Updates on the case, including a timeline, are available at http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/campaigns/
alvarado.htm.
SUMMER 2005

